CPSSMUN XII



THE 80TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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Content Disclaimer

It is important to note that this background guide is based on the existing COPUOS, and the elements that make this narrative possible are solely intended to emphasize the structure and goals of this committee. In consequence of this, this background guide will explore sensitive topics including weaponry, violence, and death. These topics serve the purpose of enhancing this committee's direction and engaging with delegates in formal debate. These ideas exist in this background guide for the overall success of the committee, and the actions and doings in this committee should by no means be replicated in real-world conduct.

Equity Concerns

Bullying and discrimination are unwelcome practices at CPSSMUN. All attendees of CPSSMUN XII will be made safe, welcomed, and appreciated, thanks to the efforts of our teacher supervisor and the Secretariat team. If any CPSSMUN Staff, Secretariat, or Delegate acts inappropriately or invokes discomfort, please contact our Equity Officer at cpssmunequity@gmail.com. This can be done at any time leading up to, during, or after the conference.

Director's Letter

Hello Esteemed Delegates,

We are so excited to welcome you to the General Assembly at CPSSMUN XII. This year marks the 80th United Nations General Assembly, a huge milestone that highlights both the challenges of the present and the opportunities of the future.

The two topics chosen were inspired by both of these aspects in mind. The first topic draws attention to the systems that govern global security and the responsibility of states and organizations in managing them. On the other hand, the second topic takes us beyond Earth, inviting us to consider what humanity's future in space might look like as space exploration moves from science fiction to reality.

Our goal is to bring these topics together to give you the chance to explore issues that affect some of the foundations of international cooperation. From questions of peace and accountability to the edges of innovation and exploration, this committee will ask you to think critically about the world we live in and the one we are building for tomorrow.

We encourage you to bring your knowledge, creativity, and open-mindedness to this debate. The General Assembly lives and perseveres by conflicting perspectives, and your ideas will determine the direction of this committee. We cannot wait to see the passion and innovative ideas you bring to this committee.

On behalf of all the staff, welcome to CPSSMUN's General Assembly!

Sincerely,
Aromal Mihraj
Jasmeet Saini

Directors of the 80th GA

Background Information

Committee Overview

The General Assembly (GA) is the primary deliberative committee of the United Nations, established in accordance with the UN Charter. It is responsible for ensuring international peace and security, encouraging social and economic cooperation, and encouraging the international system of law. With all 193 member nations, the GA is an inclusive forum for countries to debate and make decisions on issues involving the world and beyond simple regional cooperation.

The subjects of Weapons Supply Chains and Accountability, along with Space Tourism, fall within the scope of the General Assembly owing to their extensive international ramifications. The distribution of weapons and the lack of adequate accountability within global arms supply chains pose significant threats to peace and stability across various borders, thereby requiring a strategy that incorporates the interests and security apprehensions of all member states. Likewise, the commercialization of outer space, which is exemplified by private space tourism initiatives, elicits concerns regarding safety, equity, and legality that surpass the authority of any individual nation or specialized organization. Consequently, these issues require a thorough, inclusive, and legally substantiated approach to global governance by the General Assembly.

Historical Context

The General Assembly was first established in an effort to prevent the recurrence of wide-ranging conflict through the propagation of global diplomacy and cooperation. From its beginning, the GA has been effective in guiding disarmament and arms control initiatives, particularly in its advocacy for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both of which emphasize transparency, accountability, and international monitoring in regards to armaments transfer and use.

At the same time, the General Assembly has conventionally shaped the governance of outer space. By issuing multiple resolutions, in particular the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1963) and the initiative toward Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the General Assembly

has sought to keep space as a region of peaceful activity and for the use of all humankind. These precedents provide important background as the international community today faces rising issues in the governance of commercial space activities, like space tourism, while simultaneously upholding UN principles of peace, equality, and common progress.

Powers and Limitations

According to the UN Charter, the General Assembly is the principal governing and policy-making body of the UN. It can address any questions of general interest, respond to states or the Security Council with recommendations, and also initiate studies aimed at fostering international cooperation and the progressive development of international law. What distinguishes the General Assembly is its ability to set norms: resolutions, guidelines, and codes of conduct can create expectations, advance transparency, and facilitate coordination across very different institutions, including private firms. The limits to the General Assembly are equally clear. Most resolutions of the General Assembly, as a matter of international law, are typically non-binding unless they address budgetary or internal affairs; compliance ultimately depends on the states' consent and their capacity to follow through within their respective domestic systems. This is also how gaps appear in both of our topics. In the case of weapons, the ability to impose control and prevent diversion hinges on the national system and political will of each state. In the case of space tourism, commercial timelines and technologies are moving faster than multilateral rule-making, so for now we have only voluntary LTS standards and uneven national regulations to address safety.

Topics of Discussion

Topic 1: Weapons Supply Chains and Accountability

Background

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was the General Assembly's first committee, and not without reason. It was initially made as an international collaborative effort to ensure tragedies like WWII do not happen again, and it is continuing its efforts in disarmament by promoting many measures. In 2001, it promoted the UN's Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), which urges countries to regulate arms dealers, create registries of classified weaponry, and generally control the trade of weapons by means of tracing. Although these strict measures could avoid the malicious use of weapons, resolutions such as these from DISEC are not legally enforceable, leaving the responsibility to individual nations.

Hesitancy from major world powers has affected progress in solving several issues. The United States argues that the freedoms of independent nations to set their own weapons policies need protection, while Russia and China have resisted international control, seeing it as interference in their internal affairs. In direct contrast, other states such as Mexico, Nigeria, and Norway have urged greater international controls. These contrasting views reflect the weakness of DISEC's mandate; it can promote consensus on basic principles, but the implementation is a much more difficult task.

Role of ATT

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was founded in 2013 to prevent the world trade of weapons from unnecessarily lengthening wars and intensifying conflicts. The arms industry, in this way, is a major part of conflicts around the world. Although countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America have signed the treaty, many key weapons exporters have not. For example, the two biggest exporters, the United States and Russia, have yet to ratify the treaty in their trade agreements. Without a consensus, or at least action from influential nations, the world is bound to remain susceptible to armaments being used by the wrong parties for the wrong purposes.

The United States accounts for nearly 40% of all weapons exports in the world. It is followed distantly by Russia, France, Germany, China, and more. Smaller countries, on the

other hand, often lack significant influence in this market and face the consequences of these trades, as their regions are more likely to experience instability and conflict fuelled by imported weapons. Currently, war exploitation is not illegal under international law; however, the results of trading weapons are frequently not aligned with its intentions. For example, the weapons sent to Syrian rebels with plans of toppling the authoritarian regime later fell into the hands of extremist groups. In recent times, the weaponry dispatched to the Iraqi military was taken over by ISIS as it rose to power in 2014. These types of scenarios highlight the ways in which weapons supplied by outside nations can get hijacked for unintentional destructive causes. This includes civilian casualties, regional destabilization, and the exacerbation of global conflicts that affect nearly every nation through security threats and humanitarian crises.

Diversion of Weapons in Conflict Zones

Weapons diversion is a major problem that conflict zones across the world face. Especially prevalent in unstable regions of the world, where a government is unable to securely oversee trade into the country. This is worse if the arms received are used to further destabilize the region. One evident issue is how powerful countries with resources to produce military weapons directly provide weapons to rebels or other enemies of the state for the purpose of revolt. Unfortunately, a worse scenario is that of militia groups getting possession of weapons that were meant to protect against them. One such case was in 2021, after the fall of Kabul, when the Taliban took the U.S.-made rifles and military vehicles. Furthermore, in Libya, weapons sent out to strengthen the government military spread throughout the country after the breakdown of the state, giving powers to militias and giving way to a black-market trade system.

Even humanitarian intervention can influence and contribute to weapons diversion. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it was reported that weapons given to the Congolese military to stabilize the nation were later found in rebel encampments. In South Sudan, munitions that were used during the conflict were seized and found to be Turkish guns that violated international embargoes after a peace trial meant to ban them.

Private Sector and Corporate Responsibility

Defence manufacturers dominate the arms trade market with the top-100 private entities making over 600 billion USD just in 2023. Thus making them crucial when

investigating accountability behind faults in the supply chain. These firms are supposed to track and verify every aspect of their weapons dealings. Yet, as mentioned previously, weapons still find their way into unintended hands. European firms like BAE Systems and Airbus have been criticized in the past for exports that ended up exacerbating the conflict in Yemen. However, in the U.S., lobbying by major contractors allows them to make policies that benefit their profit margins within their industry. In many countries, the defence sector is so closely linked to national security and economic growth that governments are not willing to interfere with privately owned businesses for fear of their own country's reliance on those very companies.

Meanwhile, there are increasing expectations that corporations conduct thorough background checks before exporting weapons. The EU and UN have urged greater corporate auditing and reporting, yet enforcement remains uneven and mostly voluntary. A minority of states require confirmation from those who contract with defence companies, while other states let corporations "self-certify". The question is, are profit-motivated corporations best suited to police themselves in an industry where demand and silence only benefit them?

Delegates, it is now up to you to find solutions that will provide real change to this broken system of weapons supply chains. Your proposals must establish clear timelines, funding mechanisms, and enforcement procedures that provide a better alternative to current restrictions. The international community depends on solutions that ensure future security and hold those responsible accountable to prevent further damage. Your decisions will influence what the next decade looks like, so be vigilant and determined to a purposeful cause.

Case Study 1: Taliban's Capture of Kabul and its Consequences

One of the most significant instances of weapons diversion in modern warfare may have occurred in Afghanistan in August 2021, following the withdrawal of the American presence from the country. The United States and NATO allies had, over the past twenty years, been supplying billions of dollars' worth of military equipment to Afghanistan, with the hope of developing it into a formidable national defence. This comprised more than 600,000 small arms, 75,000 vehicles, and thousands of drones and aircraft that were provided to the Afghan security forces. The weapons were provided in good faith to what was believed to be a stable government. Nonetheless, the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Army

showed there were significant gaps and vulnerabilities in the chain of supplying foreign weapons.

As the Taliban advanced through major provincial cities in mid-2021, government troops often abandoned their posts and equipment rather than fighting back. The Black Hawk helicopters, rifles, and Humvees (military vehicles) manufactured in the U.S. were left behind at bases that were quickly overrun. By August 15, 2021, when Kabul was captured by the Taliban, they had acquired a stock of weapons that rivalled the arsenals of certain governments in the region. Reports issued subsequently by the U.S. Department of Defence later confirmed that billions of dollars' worth of weapons had been captured with minimal accountability.

The U.S. was supplying the Afghan forces with quality equipment, but it did not ensure proper storage and security. Supply chains intended to strengthen national defence caused instability instead when the central government collapsed. It also highlights the reality that U.S. training programs and NATO supervision were unable to prevent corruption in the Afghan army. These factors ensured that weapons would fall into the wrong hands.

This was indirectly connected to the private sector, since major players in the U.S. defence industry, such as Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, were able to win contracts to ship weapons to the Afghan forces, but once the weapons were shipped, limited tracking and accountability measures were in place. This demonstrates how poor accountability has become standard within the arms market: once the arms have been sold, there is little one can do regarding how the arms are used or where they end up.

Guiding Questions

1. Should an international arms monitoring agency with independent verification powers be established, and how would it operate?
2. How should military armament corporations be regulated to prevent the use of loopholes within weapon exports?
3. How can peacekeeping operations better balance their dual roles as regulators and potential risks for weapons diversion?
4. What mechanisms can ensure that accountability measures do not disproportionately burden developing nations seeking legitimate defence capabilities?
5. What is the best method to dispose of and/or allocate military equipment after a conflict?

Topic 2: Commercializing the Cosmos - Space Tourism

Space tourism relates to the activity of private citizens paying to travel into space. The first private tourist was Dennis Tito, who was paid to travel to the International Space Station (ISS) in 2001. He was the first private tourist and was part of a Russian program which paid him. Since then, there have been very few people who have attempted similar trips. Most of them did so by partnering with government space agencies. Now, companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic have taken the idea further by offering sub-orbital flights which go to lower Earth orbit.

The world's space economy is expanding rapidly and needs attention from different countries. In 2021, it was worth approximately $570 billion, and by 2023, it had increased to $613 billion. Most of this comes from commercial companies. However, there is a lag in space law as it has not caught up to the new advancements. The 1967 Outer Space treaty claims that space is a territory which belongs to every human being, thus there cannot be a claim from one country. However, it states very little about private companies that send tourists into space. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is the only body which protects and supervises activities in space. They have yet to provide an answer on how space tourism fits into the new order.

Economic Opportunities and Risks

Currently, companies are looking at building space hotels, laboratories, and even construction projects that could support future settlements. In 2023, Virgin Galactic undertook its first research flight in collaboration with the Italian Air Force, which showcased how space tourism could accommodate scientific experiments. Blue Origin reactivated its New Shepard sub-orbital flights in 2024 for private citizens. Axiom Space partnered with NASA to fly privately-funded astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), with countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey paying for their citizens to launch. NASA has even begun making small investments in privately funded space stations like "Orbital Reef," as a potential replacement of the ISS upon retirement around the year 2030.

The potential for an economic impact in this area is significant; however, economic risk exists as well. Currently, only a limited number of companies put people into space, leading to concerns about monopolies and the concentration of power. Countries, including China, are trying to penetrate the market, with CAS Space expecting sub-orbital tourism by 2027 or 2028. Nonetheless, the bigger question is whether space tourism will simply become yet another billion-dollar industry or whether it has the potential to become a broader industry.

Equity and Access

Currently, space tourism is only available to wealthy people around the world. Virgin Galactic has sold tickets for $450,000-$600,000 USD per seat, and Blue Origin once sold a seat for $28 million. Orbital trips are even more expensive. They can cost around $55-65 million USD per passenger. As a result of high inequality, there have been some efforts to make access available to a wider demographic. In 2024, Blue Origin flew Ed Dwight, who was the first Black astronaut in the US during the 1960s, but never got the chance to go to space. Other countries like Turkey, Sweden, and Italy have also already bought seats on private missions, showing how national goals can open doors for more people. Moreover, the United Nations has programs, like “Access to Space for All,” which help developing countries launch small satellites and learn about space tech, though these do not yet cover tourism. Even with these efforts, many are still concerned about whether space tourism will increase global inequality or if it will eventually spread benefits more widely.

Safety and Liability

Space travel raises important safety issues. What happens if a spacecraft crashes, or if something goes wrong in orbit? International law does not specifically consider paying passengers, which raises the issue of liability. The Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Liability Convention (1972) state that the countries in charge of space activities are liable for damage caused, which means that if a company based in the US or UK launched a rocket that caused damage, that country would be liable. Again, the treaties do not address what protections are provided to individual tourists.

As a result, countries established their own legal framework. In the U.S., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires passengers to sign an "informed consent" agreement

indicating that space travel has a certain amount of risks involved. The companies also must provide insurance coverage for an accident or incident, and the government is liable for a large loss that goes above the insurance coverage provided. The U.K. adopts a similar framework; however, the U.K. has limits on the insurance coverage to ensure businesses can plan costs. Yet there are still significant gaps. For example, if someone were to become injured at a future privately operated space hotel, the applicable legal system and which sovereign state would be held liable would remain unclear.

Ethical Dimensions

The biggest ethical issue is whether humanity should spend billions on space tourism while there are problems on Earth to attend to. Critics argue that spending money on joyrides for rich people is wasteful at a time when poverty, hunger, and climate change require immediate action. Defenders reply that space tourism provides public inspiration and builds technologies which can one day serve humanity as a whole. As an example, Axiom missions have carried out valuable research on board the ISS, such as trace contaminant analysis of atmospheres.

Environmental problems represent another hurdle. Rockets deposit particles in the upper atmosphere, and this can destroy the ozone layer and contribute to climate change. Though emissions from rockets are small in comparison to worldwide airplane flights, their effects at high altitude are more severe. The rapid expansion of space tourism could develop this into a larger problem.

Future Regulation

Rules will determine if space travel will be safe and equitable or costly and unequal. Internationally, COPUOS has already approved 21 guidelines for long-term space activity sustainability. These can be extended to include tourism, passenger safety, emissions, and regulations for avoiding space debris. There are also plans for an international code of private industry conduct, which could establish customary safety and insurance procedures.

At the same time, national governments are also updating laws of their own. In the United States, the FAA is still in a "learning phase" and does not set tough passenger safety regulations. In the United Kingdom, they have passed the Space Industry Act (2018) and have established specific insurance regulations for companies. The UN General Assembly

has even regulated destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) tests to prevent accidents, illustrating how security and tourism can intersect. As new nations and companies come into this sector, common international regulations will be necessary to avoid accidents, provide equality, and keep space available for peaceful uses.

Case Study 2: FAA Regulations & Passenger Safety

The United States began to take space tourism more seriously as a commercial market sector beginning in the mid-2000s and established various safety regulations to allow for its progress. Following the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act in 2004, Congress assigned the FAA the oversight of licensed launches to ensure public safety to the extent possible. However, the FAA could not implement strict, rigorous requirements for passenger safety during what was referred to as the "learning period." Passengers did not fly to space under strict requirements, but under informed consent documents that described anticipated risks. Congress has extended the safety regulation pause multiple times, which will now last until January 1, 2028. The FAA has added licensing during this pause, but the system is still focused more on operator responsibilities than on specific passenger protection regulations. Some argue that this has opened the door to investment and allowed companies like Virgin Galactic to eventually start commercial flights in 2023, while others believe that by allowing companies to profit from space tourism, they gamble with passenger comfort and safety.

Recently, accidents that occurred in the learning period have demonstrated the consequences of ignorance. In 2007, a ground test explosion at Mojave related to SpaceShipTwo killed three workers in hybrid-propellant tests. The State of California subsequently blamed Scaled Composites for insufficient safety measures, raising questions about regulation and oversight. In 2014, SpaceShipTwo broke up while in flight, which caused the copilot to die. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that there were insufficient design safeguards, which mandatory passenger safety standards would have addressed earlier. The FAA has maintained its focus on public safety but has left passengers on informed consent and required disclosure documents instead of meeting aviation certification rules. Agencies may be forced to take substantive passenger safety regulations only after Congress ends the pause. In short, the learning-period model of the regulatory approach has sped space tourism into the market, but did not consider how to

manage innovation and the safety of the passengers in a manner that is credible, transparent, and equitable.

Guiding Questions

1. Should access to space tourism be expanded through international subsidies, or left as a market-driven industry?
2. How can inequality between wealthy and developing nations be avoided in space tourism?
3. Should governments end “learning periods” and enforce strict passenger safety rules?
4. Is it ethical to fund space tourism while there are so many issues on Earth?
5. Should space tourism be restricted until its environmental effects are fully studied, or should innovation take priority?

Award Criteria

Foreign Policy Representation

CPSSMUN requires all delegates to do extensive research on their foreign policy and country/character stance to adequately represent them. They are encouraged to propose solutions that their respective countries would support in reality. Delegates are encouraged to propose creative solutions, but they can not come at the expense of their country's motivations and alignment. Delegates are expected to remain consistent with their country's foreign policy. Significant deviations without clear justification may be viewed unfavorably.

There are no limitations on advocacy so long as it remains logical, appropriate and consistent with their country. This directly applies to all delegates who represent countries with what many consider more "extreme" positions or values. Delegates will have some degree of freedom to negotiate extensions to their foreign policy. However, please be advised to check who represents a nation at the United Nations, as countries like Afghanistan do not have the Taliban representing them, but their government in exile.

The chairs will first warn delegates who do not follow national policies, and discrepancies will be noted. If the delegate continues to violate foreign policy after one warning, they are not eligible for awards. In the scenario that a delegate's foreign policy compromises their ability to garner support from the committee and pass a paper, that individual delegate remains eligible to win an award if they perform well in all other categories.

Ideation and Creativity

Ideation and creativity are key metrics to determine the award. CPSSMUN looks favourably upon delegates who demonstrate their critical thinking skills through innovative, comprehensive, and creative solutions that the committees should adopt. This includes building off of past solutions and adapting/amending past papers with new, distinct aspects.

All draft resolutions are expected to be costed. This means that all papers will have a financing mechanism to pay for the ideas they are proposing**.** Although chairs do not require delegates to present hyper-precise numbers (exactly how much a program would cost in total), delegates must have a general idea of the cost and research feasible funding strategies for their ideas. Delegates do NOT have the ability to commit their country to paying for projects, as that is beyond the powers of a delegate, and this policy applies to groups of

countries as well. Additionally, delegates are advised to avoid using the IMF and the World Bank as funding mechanisms, since, in reality, they are incredibly selective in issuing aid and typically already have all of their funds allocated towards projects. Delegates are also advised to avoid using charities and non-profit organizations as financing sources, as they are not only incredibly limited in the funds that they have, but they are also independent third parties whose involvement in government projects may be contentious and/or volatile. Instead, delegates are advised to create policy solutions to pay for projects (programs that generate revenue), policy solutions that are generally costless, or specific & particular cost-saving measures that can offset new projects.

Evident solutions, such as sending peacekeepers and funding (the second is required), are common aspects of a solution, and delegates will not be penalized for using them. But, these solutions must elaborate on further specifics, like in the peacekeeping example, where the peacekeepers are going to be located, their strategy and conditions of operation. If a delegate fails to do so, it will reflect negatively when awards are being deliberated. Furthermore, CPSSMUN encourages students to find more unique/inventive solutions, with similar effects (and detail), the chairs will take that into account when deliberating awards and on this criterion, weigh it over an easily discoverable solution through the internet.

Furthermore, CPSSMUN will not reward delegates who reuse ideas from past solutions without improving or transforming them, as the chairs will consider it dilatory and unproductive for the committee. If a delegate in the General Assembly wishes to create a subcommittee without adequate justification, the chair may view it less favourably. Additionally, delegates who propose similar solutions to past actions already done must present distinctions and improvements.

Diplomacy and Sportsmanship

This criterion is the cornerstone of Model UN as it requires delegates to remain professional and tactful when discussing political issues. Diplomacy and sportsmanship value delegates who can not only persuade and influence the committee's direction but also inspire other delegates. Diplomacy and sportsmanship are considered factors, as CPSSMUN will not award delegates who are unprofessional and discourteous without cause.

Diplomacy includes negotiating and managing relations to be mutually beneficial and ensuring peaceful dialogue and collaboration. Furthermore, good sportsmanship reflects the value of working alongside fellow delegates while pursuing their own goals. If a delegate is

being undiplomatic, like refusing to negotiate (without a reason) with another bloc, the chairs will take note of that, and it may negatively impact their chances of winning awards.

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